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Abstract
It is shown in [5, 7] that a functional interpretation of proofs in math-
ematical analysis can be given by the product of selection functions, a
mode of recursion that has an intuitive reading in terms of the computa-
tion of optimal strategies in sequential games. We argue that this result
has genuine practical value by interpreting some well-known theorems of
mathematics and demonstrating that the product gives these theorems a
natural computational interpretation that can be clearly understood in
game theoretic terms.
1 Introduction
Over the last century, mathematicians and computer scientists have become
increasingly interested in understanding the computational content of mathe-
matical proofs.
A central feature of modern mathematics is the use of non-constructive meth-
ods that allow us to reason about infinitary objects without providing any com-
putational justification. In the 1920’s Hilbert’s program broadly addressed the
task of understanding non-constructive mathematics in computational terms,
which led to the development of important proof-theoretic techniques such as
cut-elimination, the ε-method, and proof interpretations. These were used to
obtain significant foundational results such as relative consistency proofs for
arithmetic and analysis.
In recent decades these metamathematical devices whose roots lie in foun-
dational problems have been employed more directly towards the extraction of
programs from non-constructive proofs. This shift of emphasis has its origins
in the fundamental work of Kreisel on the ‘unwinding’ of proofs [16, 17], and
has now become the focus of a considerable amount of research in logic and
computer science.
Among the most effective tools for extracting constructive information from
proofs are the proof interpretations, which include Freidman’s A-translation [9]
and Go¨del’s dialectica interpretation [11]. The latter in particular is central to
the highly successful proof mining program (see Kohlenbach [14]), in which the
analysis of proofs using its monotone variant has led to the development of quite
general meta-theorems guaranteeing the extraction of effective uniform bounds
from theorems in analysis.
While proof interpretations have been widely applied in logic and computer
science, the qualitative (computational) behaviour of their output has received
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relatively little attention. Indeed, the operational semantics of programs ex-
tracted from even relatively simple classical proofs are often very difficult to
understand. This is mainly due to two factors:
1. Higher-order computation. Even when computing a witness of type N
the constructions involved will work on much higher types, usually types 1
and 2. Go¨del’s primitive recursor itself even for the lowest type is already
an object of type 2.
2. Syntactic nature of proof interpretations and translations. Ex-
tracted programs tend to be hidden beneath a complex layer of syntax
that generally accompanies formal translations on proofs.
Moreover, relatively little work has gone into addressing these issues because
more often than not proof interpretations are a means to an end – be it a
consistency proof or the extraction of a uniform bound – and a qualitative
understanding of their output is simply irrelevant.
Nevertheless, the idea of stripping functional interpretations of their syntax
and appreciating how they work from a mathematical perspective is an interest-
ing one. It has been observed by Gaspar and Kohlenbach [10, 14] that the kind
of logical manipulations carried out by the dialectica interpretation is closely re-
lated to the so-called correspondence principle between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ analysis
discussed by T. Tao in [23, 24]. In this sense one could potentially view func-
tional interpretations as devices that transform classical proofs into constructive
proofs of a ‘finitized’ form of the original theorem, although actually translating
their output into what a mathematician would consider a proof seems far from
straightforward.
In recent work [5, 7, 19] the authors and M. Escardo´ have sought to better
understand programs extracted by the dialectica interpretation. Here it is shown
that the dialectica interpretation of the key combination of classical logic and
countable choice can be realized by the product of selection functions (as opposed
to the usual bar recursion of Spector [22]), an intuitive mode of computation
that can be understood as computing optimal strategies in a class of sequential
games.
Consider, for instance, an ∃∀-theorem ∃xX∀yY A(x, y), with A(x, y) a de-
cidable predicate, and x and y having types X and Y respectively. We shall
think of X as a set of available moves, and Y as the set of possible outcomes
of a game. The predicate A(x, y) is then understood as prescribing what are
the good outcomes y given any particular move x. The theorem then says that
there exists a single move for which all possible outcomes are considered good.
Now, if the theorem has been proven classically, such a move will be shown to
exist but it might not be effectively computable. What we should do then is to
consider the ‘constructive’ equivalent of the theorem via the negative transla-
tion, namely ¬¬∃xX∀yY A(x, y). This can also be put in the form ∃∀, and in
fact that is precisely what the dialectica interpretation does. In this case we
would obtain the (classically) equivalent theorem
∃ε(X→Y )→X∀pX→Y A(εp, p(εp)).
Although x : X might not be effectively computable, it turns out that the selec-
tion function ε : (X → Y )→ X is. Moreover, we can extend our game-theoretic
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reading and view p : X → Y as a mapping from moves to outcomes. What the
selection function ε does is to pick, for any given such mapping p, a move x = εp
whose corresponding outcome according to p, namely y = px is a good outcome
for x.
Now suppose we are given a countable family of ∀∃-predicates ∃x∀yAn(x, y)
interpreted by a sequence of selection functions (εn). By classical countable
choice there exists a sequence f : N→ X satisfying ∀n, yAn(fn, y). The dialec-
tica interpretation of ¬¬∃f∀n, yAn(fn, y) states that for any given functions
q : XN → Y and ω : XN → N there exists a functional f such that
∀n ≤ ωf An(fn, qf).
Therefore, thinking of each An(x, y) as prescribing the “good” pairs of move-
outcome for round n, the task above corresponds in finding a sequence of moves
f which leads to an outcome y = qf that is considered good at all rounds up to
point ωf . We will see that the product of the selection functions (εn) calculates
such f , and this construction can be viewed as the calculation of an optimal
strategy in a sequential game whose “goal” at round n – given by the selection
function εn – is to pick a move with a good outcome for the predicate An.
The aim of this article is to demonstrate that, in practise, program extraction
using the product of selection of functions and its game-theoretic semantics
leads to a much better appreciation of the constructive content of proofs in
analysis. We illustrate this using a number of well known classical theorems,
many of which have been extensively analysed by proof theorists. In particular
we include a detailed analysis of a proof of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, the
interpretation of which is by no means trivial, but from which we are nevertheless
able to extract a program that can be given a clear description in the language
of sequential games.
In the course of the paper our aim is to portray the dialectica interpretation
as an intelligent translation whose output can be read and understood in math-
ematical terms. As such we endeavour to phrase the higher type functionals
that arise from the interpretation using a more informal vocabulary. This ap-
proach owes a lot to the aforementioned work by Gaspar and Kohlenbach, and
it is hoped that our work will complement theirs in forming another small step
towards understanding the mathematical significance of proof interpretations.
1.1 Preliminaries
We work in the language of Peano arithmetic in all finite types PAω. The finite
types T contain a basic type N and whenever X,Y ∈ T then X → Y ∈ T, i.e.
T = {N,N→ N, (N→ N)→ N, . . .}.
Closely related to PAω is Go¨del’s system T of primitive recursive functionals
of finite type. This quantifier-free calculus is essentially primitive recursive
arithmetic PRA with the schema of recursion extended to all types X ∈ T, i.e.
Rn(h)(g)
X
=
{
g if n = 0
hn(Rn−1(h)(g)) if n > 0.
(1)
For full details of these theories the reader is referred to [1]. We make informal
use of types like B, Q, finite sequences types X∗ etc. as elements of these types
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can be encoded as elements of a suitable type in T.
Notation. We make use of the following abbreviations:
0X is the obvious canonical zero of type X .
s ∗ t is the concatenation of sequences s and t.
s  t for “s is a prefix of t”.
ŝ ≡ s ∗ 0X
N
the canonical infinite extension of a finite sequence s.
[α](n) ≡ 〈α0, . . . , α(n− 1)〉 is the initial segment of α of length n.
µn ≤ N . P (n) is the bounded search operator that returns the least n ≤ N
satisfying the decidable predicate P (n) if one exists, or N otherwise.
1.2 The dialectica interpretation
We assume that the reader is familiar with Go¨del’s dialectica interpretation
(details of which are covered in full in [1, 14]), although we recall below a few
basic facts to familiarise the reader with our notation and terminology.
The dialectica interpretation maps formulas A of some specified theory S to
a decidable binary relation |A|xy definable in a specified quantifier-free system
of functionals F. The canonical instance of this mapping is when S is Heyting
arithmetic in all finite types and F is Go¨del’s system T.
In |A|xy we have that x and y stand for (possibly empty) tuples of objects
of finite type. We think of x as the witnessing variables and y as the challenge
variables. The intuition is that A is logically equivalent to ∃x∀y|A|xy . The
translation is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Go¨del’s dialectica interpretation). For atomic formulas P we
set |P | := P , with x and y both empty tuples. Assuming that we have already
defined |A|xy and |B|
u
v , we define
|A ∧B|x,vy,w := |A|
x
y ∧ |B|
v
w
|A ∨B|x,v,by,w := (b = 0 ∧ |A|
x
y) ∨ (b = 1 ∧ |A|
v
w)
|A→ B|f,gx,w := |A|
x
gxw → |B|
fx
w
|∀zA(z)|fy,z := |A(z)|
fz
y
|∃zA(z)|x,zy := |A(z)|
x
y .
We say that S is (dialectica) interpreted in F if whenever S ⊢ A we can construct
some t ∈ F such that F ⊢ |A|ty.
In order to interpret classical theories, the dialectica interpretation is typ-
ically composed with a negative translation1 N to form the so-called ND in-
terpretation. In the remainder of the paper, by functional interpretation we
specifically mean the ND interpretation. A classical theory T has a functional
interpretation in F if whenever T ⊢ A we can construct some t ∈ F satisfying
∀y|AN |ty.
1As in [14] we adopt Kuroda’s variant of the negative translation.
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In his original paper on the dialectica interpretation, Go¨del proved that
Peano arithmetic has a functional interpretation in the primitive recursive func-
tionals of finite type T. Later, Spector extended Go¨del’s result to classical
analysis by realizing the dialectica interpretation of the negative translation of
the axiom of countable choice AC0 with a novel, but rather abstruse form of
recursion called bar recursion SBR.
Theorem 2. The following are well-known:
(a) PAω has a functional interpretation in T (Go¨del [11]).
(b) PAω + AC0 has a functional interpretation in T+ SBR (Spector [22]).
The main purpose of this paper is to show that these soundness theorems
can be reformulated in terms of the product of selection functions, and that this
reformulation is better suited towards understanding the behaviour of programs
extracted by the dialectica interpretation.
1.3 Outline of article
We begin in Section 2 by introducing the product of selection functions and
showing that it can be characterised as an operation that computes optimal
strategies in sequential games.
In the main part of the paper we then discuss how the language of selec-
tion functions is well suited to capturing the way in which the dialectica inter-
pretation works, and in particular the product of selection functions directly
interprets countable choice.
We then present a short case study (Section 4) in which we extract a program
from a proof of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem via the product of selection
functions and demonstrate that our program has a clear game-theoretic seman-
tics.
We conclude by briefly discussing some of the problems we face in gaining
a more intuitive understanding of functional interpretations, and outline some
potential directions for further research.
2 Selection Functions and Sequential Games
This section constitutes a brief overview of work that is presented in full else-
where, e.g. the reader is referred to the original paper [6] or a recent survey [7]
for a more detailed treatment.
A selection function is defined to be any element of type (X → R)→ X (as
in [6] we abbreviate this type to JRX). Closely related to a selection function
ε : JRX is its corresponding quantifier ε¯ : (X → R)→ R defined by ε¯p := p(εp).
The intuition is to view ε as a selector that given a function p : X → R picks
a particular element of εp of X that attains its quantifier ε¯, as the following
examples illustrate.
Example 3. (a) The canonical example of a selection function and its associ-
ated quantifier is when R forms a set of truth values e.g. R = B. Hilbert’s
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epsilon term of type X , εX : JBX is a selection function whose correspond-
ing quantifier is just the usual existential quantifier ∃X for predicates over
type X , since by definition we have
∃xX p(x)⇔ p(εXp).
(b) By the mean value theorem there exists a selection function ε : J[0,1]R such
that for any continuous function p : [0, 1]→ R we have
p(εp) =
∫ 1
0
p(x)dx.
Its corresponding quantifier is the operator
∫ 1
0 .
(c) Assume we are given a position in a game where we have to pick a move
in X . A strategy for that position can be defined by a selection function
ε : JRX determining an optimal move for each given mapping p : X → R
of possible moves x ∈ X to corresponding outcomes p(x) ∈ R.
The theory of selection functions and quantifiers forms the basis of [5, 6, 7].
One of the main achievements of these papers has been to define a product oper-
ation on selection functions (along with a corresponding operation on quantifiers
which we do not discuss further here). They demonstrate that the product of
selection functions is an extremely versatile construction that appears naturally
in several different areas of mathematics and computer science, such as fixed
point theory (Bekicˇ’s lemma), algorithms (backtracking), game theory (back-
ward induction) and, as we also discuss in Section 3, proof theory.
In the remainder of the section we define (following [6]) the product of selec-
tion functions, and explain how this procedure can be best understood via the
computation of optimal strategies in a certain class of sequential games.
Definition 4 (Binary product of selection functions [6]). Given a selection
function ε : JRX and family of selection functions δx : JRY and a predicate
q : X × Y → R, let
A[xX ]
Y
:= δ(x, λy.q(x, y))
a
X
:= ε(λx.q(x,A[x])).
The binary product ε⊗δ is another selection function, of type JR(X×Y ), defined
by
(ε⊗ δ)(q)
X×Y
:= 〈a,A[a]〉.
If δ is independent of x we can this the simple product of selection functions.
The general case is then also called the dependent product of selection functions.
The binary product constructs a composite selection function on the type
X × Y in the obvious way:
Example 5. Continuing from Example 3 we have:
(a) It is easy to show that the product of ε operators εX ⊗ εY is an epsilon
operator of type X × Y in the sense that
∃xX∃yY q(x, y)⇔ q((εX ⊗ εY )(q)).
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(b) Given a continuous function q : [0, 1]2 → R we have
q((ε⊗ ε)(q)) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
q(x, y) dxdy.
(c) Given strategies ε0, ε1 for each round in a two round sequential game with
outcome function q : X0×X1 → R, then (ε0⊗ ε1)(q) forms an strategy for
the game which is “compatible” with the local strategies ε0 and ε1. This
key instance of the product is discussed in more detail below.
As described in [6], we can iterate the binary product of selection functions
a finite or an unbounded number of times, where the length of the iteration is
dependent on the output of the product in the following sense.
Definition 6 (Iterated product of selection functions [6]). Suppose we are given
a family of selection functions (εs : JRX). The explicitly controlled unbounded
product of the selection functions εs is defined by the recursion schema
EPS
ω
s (ε)(q)
XN
=
{
0 if ω(ŝ) < |s|
(εs ⊗ λx.EPS
ω
s∗x(ε))(q) otherwise
(2)
where s : X∗, q : XN → R and ω : XN → N.
The functional ω acts as a control, terminating the procedure once it has
produced a sequence s satisfying ω(ŝ) < |s|. The unbounded product is total in
any model of bar recursion, which in particular must admit Spector’s condition:
∀ωX
N→N, αX
N
∃n
(
ω([̂α](n)) < n
)
.
These include the models of continuous functionals and the majorizable func-
tionals. On the other hand, when ω is a constant function, say ωα = n, this
corresponds to a finite iteration of the binary product and this restricted in-
stance of the product is definable in the primitive recursive functionals and
therefore exists in any model of system T.
By unwinding the definition of the binary product in (2) we obtain an equiv-
alent equation
EPS
ω
s (ε)(q)
XN
=
{
0 if ω(ŝ) < |s|
as ∗ EPS
ω
s∗as(ε)(qas) otherwise
(3)
where as = εs(λx.EPS
ω
s∗x(ε)(qx)) and qa(α) = q(a ∗ α).
For fixed ω, ε and q one can think of EPSωs (ε)(q) as computing an infinite
extension to any given finite sequence s. The key property of EPS is that the
infinite extension of an initial segment [α](n) of a previous infinite extension α
is identical to the original infinite extension. Formally:
Lemma 7 (cf. [22], lemma 1). Let α = EPSωs (ε)(q). For all n,
α = [α](n) ∗ EPSωs∗[α](n)(ε)(q[α](n)). (4)
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Proof. By induction on n. If n = 0 this follows by the definition of α. Assume
(4) holds for n, we wish to show it also holds for n+ 1. Consider two cases.
(a) If ω(s ∗ [α](n) ∗ 0) < n then EPSωs∗[α](n)(ε)(q[α](n)) = 0
XN . By induction
hypothesis α = [α](n) ∗ 0, so that α(n) = 0X . Therefore α = [α](n + 1) ∗ 0,
which, by extensionality, implies ω(s∗[α](n+1)∗0) = ω(s∗[α](n)∗0) < n < n+1.
Hence, EPSωs∗[α](n+1)(ε)(q[α](n+1)) = 0
XN so that
[α](n+ 1) ∗ EPSωs∗[α](n+1)(ε)(q[α](n+1)) = [α](n + 1) ∗ 0 = [α](n) ∗ 0 = α.
(b) If ω(s ∗ [α](n) ∗ 0) ≥ n, then
α
(IH)
= [α](n) ∗ EPSωs∗[α](n)(ε)(q[α](n))
(3)
= [α](n) ∗ c ∗ EPSωs∗[α](n)∗c(ε)(q[α](n)∗c),
where c = εs∗[α](n)(λx.EPS
ω
s∗[α](n)∗x(ε)(qs∗[α](n)∗x)). Hence, α(n) = c. There-
fore
α = [α](n+ 1) ∗ EPSωs∗[α](n+1)(ε)(q[α](n+1)).
This lemma is the main building block behind the proof of the following
fundamental theorem about EPS.
Theorem 8 (Main theorem on EPS). Let q : XN → R and ω : XN → N and
εs : JRX be given. Define
α
XN
= EPSω〈 〉(ε)(q)
ps(x)
R
= EPSωs∗x(ε)(qs∗x).
For n ≤ ω(α) we have
α(n)
X
= ε[α](n)(p[α](n))
qα
R
= ε[α](n)(p[α](n)).
(5)
Proof. Assume n ≤ ω(α). We argue that (∗) n ≤ ω([α](n) ∗ 0). Otherwise,
assuming n > ω([α](n) ∗ 0) we would have, by Lemma 7, that α = [α](n) ∗ 0.
And hence, n > ω([α](n) ∗ 0) = ω(α) ≥ n, which is a contradiction. Hence, we
have that
α(n)
L7
= EPSω[α](n)(ε)(q[α](n))(0)
(3)+(∗)
= ε[α](n)(λx.EPS
ω
[α](n)∗x(ε)(q[α](n)∗x))
= ε[α](n)(p[α](n)),
by the definition of ps. For the second equality, we have
qα
L7
= q[α](n+1)(EPS
ω
[α](n+1)(ε)(q[α](n+1)))
= p[α](n)(α(n))
= ε[α](n)(p[α](n)),
where the last equality uses that α(n) = ε[α](n)(p[α](n)) is already shown.
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Theorem 8 characterises the product of selection functions as computing
a sequence α that forms a kind of sequential equilibrium between the selection
functions – expressed by the equations (5) – up to a point ωα parametrised by α
itself. The significance of the product is that such equilibria appear naturally in
a variety of contexts. In the following we outline perhaps the most illuminating
of these contexts, namely the theory of sequential games.
2.1 Sequential games and optimal strategies
One of the most remarkable property of EPS is that it computes optimal strate-
gies in a certain class of sequential games. The reader is encouraged to consult
[7] in conjunction with the relatively concise discussion here.
As in this article we only consider games (in the sense of [7]) where the
quantifiers are attainable, we shall incorporate this restriction in the definition
of the game itself.
Definition 9 (Sequential games of unbounded length, [7]). The type of a game
is given by a pair (X,R) where
• X is the set of possible moves at each round.
• R is the set of possible outcomes of the game.
A finite sequence s : X∗ shall be thought of as a position in the game determined
by the first |s| moves. An infinite sequence α : XN is called a play of the game.
An unbounded sequential game of type (X,R) is a triple (ε, q, ω) where
• εs : JRX determines the optimal move at position s.
• q : XN → R determines, given a play α : XN, the outcome of the game.
• ω : XN → N determines the relevant part of a play.
The functions q is called the outcome function, whereas ω is called the control
function. Given a play α, all moves α(i) for i ≤ ωα are relevant moves. In
general, a position s is called relevant if |s| ≤ ωsˆ, i.e. if in a canonical extension
of the current position s the current move is considered a relevant move.
We shall only consider infinite plays which are obtained by some canonical
extension of a finite play s. Therefore, we think of these as finite games of
unbounded length.
The intuition behind Definition 9 is as follows. We think of the selection
functions εs as specifying at position s what an optimal move at that point
would be if we knew the final outcome corresponding to each of the candidate
moves. The selection function takes this mapping X → R of moves to outcomes
and tells us what an optimal move would be in that particular case.
A strategy in such game is simply a function next : X∗ → X which deter-
mines for each position s what the next move next(s) should be. To follow
a strategy from position s means to play all following moves according to the
strategy, i.e. we obtain a sequence of moves α(0), α(1), . . . as
α(i) = next(s ∗ [α](i − 1)).
We call this the strategic extension of s. The strategic extension of the empty
play is called the strategic play.
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Definition 10 (Optimal strategies). A strategy is said to be optimal2 if the
move played at each relevant position s is the one recommended by the selection
function εs, i.e.
next(s) = εs(λx.q(s ∗ x ∗ α)) (6)
where α is the strategic extension of s ∗ x.
The main result of [7] is that the product of selection functions computes
optimal strategies:
Theorem 11 ([7]). Given a game (ε, q, ω), the strategy
next(s)
X
= (EPSωs (ε)(q))0 (7)
is optimal, and, moreover,
α
XN
= EPSωs (ε)(qs) (8)
is the strategic extension of s, i.e. α(n) = next(s ∗ [α](n)).
Proof. We have that
α(n)
(8)
= EPSωs (ε)(qs)(n)
L7
= EPSωs∗[α](n)(ε)(qs∗[α](n))(0)
(7)
= next(s ∗ [α](n)),
which proves the second claim. Hence, assuming s is a relevant position, i.e.
(∗) ω(sˆ) ≥ |s| we have
next(s)
(7)
= (EPSωs (ε)(qs))0
(3)+(∗)
= εs(λx.EPS
ω
s∗x(ε)(qs∗x))
= εs(λx.q(s ∗ x ∗ β))
where β = EPSωs∗x(ε)(qs∗x), by the second claim just proven above, is the strate-
gic extension of s ∗ x. Hence, we have shown (6).
Therefore in this sense the main Theorem 8 characterises EPS as a procedure
that computes an optimal strategy in the game defined by (ε, q, ω). We now
show that the product also appears naturally in proof theory, with the advantage
that it can be related back to the language of sequential games.
3 The dialectica interpretation of classical proofs
We now show how selection functions and their product are intrinsically con-
nected to the functional interpretation of classical proofs. The key observation
is that the language of selection functions elegantly captures the way in which
2This is a stronger notion than the one introduced in [7] for the more general case where
the quantifiers are not necessarily attainable.
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the dialectica interpretation treats double negations in negative-translated for-
mulas. In particular the product directly interprets the double negation shift
that arises from the negative translation of the axiom of countable choice.
This means that in many cases the algorithms extracted from classical proofs
can be easily phrased in the intuitive language of sequential games. Moreover,
though couched in the language of higher type recursive functionals, these games
often have a natural informal reading in terms of strategic set-theoretic con-
structions, making the mathematical meaning of the extracted program more
perspicuous.
3.1 Interpreting Σ2 theorems
Suppose are given a Σ2 theorem A ≡ ∃x
X∀yYA0(x, y) where A0 is decidable.
The negative translation of A is equivalent to ¬¬∃x∀yA0(x, y), and therefore
its functional interpretation is given by
|AN |εp = A0(εp, p(εp)).
In other words, the dialectica interpretation eliminates double negations in front
of a Σ2 formula with a selection function ε : JYX . If the predicate A0(x, y) is
thought of as prescribing ‘good’ outcomes y for a particular move x as described
in Section 1, then ε implements a strategy that selects a move x = εp whose
outcome with respect to the mapping p is good.
Thus under the functional interpretation we have the following mapping:
Σ2 Theorems 7→ Selection functions.
The elimination of double negations in an arbitrary negated formula is essen-
tially a (albeit complex) modular iteration of this process, suggesting to us
that selection functions and modes of recursion based on selection functions lie
behind the functional interpretation in a fundamental way.
There are several ways of characterising the selection function ε interpreting
A. For Σ2 theorems Kreisel’s no counterexample interpretation coincides with
the functional interpretation and in this sense the constructive interpretation of
A is a selection function ε that refutes an arbitrary ‘counterexample’ functions
p. The following example demonstrates how selection functions are fundamental
to the functional interpretation of pure classical logic.
Example 12 (Law of excluded middle). Consider the following simple reformula-
tion of the law of excluded middle for Σ1 formulas, better known as the drinkers
paradox :
DP : ∃xX(∃yP (y)→ P (x)). (9)
Note that DP is intuitionistically equivalent to the Σ2 theorem ∃x∀y(P (y) →
P (x)). We ineffectively justify the principle by defining
x :=
{
y for some y satisfying P (y)
0X if no such y exists
.
On the other hand, we can effectively justify the principle with the selection
function
εp :=
{
p(0X) if P (p(0X))
0X if ¬P (p(0X))
(10)
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that witnesses its functional interpretation:
|DP|εp = P (p(εp))→ P (εp). (11)
The drinkers paradox is essentially the law of excluded middle applied to the
Σ1-formula ∃yP (y) i.e.
∃bB(b = 0↔ ∃yP (y))
where the boolean b is given by P (x). The mapping p : X → X in the functional
interpretation of DP can be seen as a counterexample function that attempts to
witness ¬DP i.e.
∀x(¬P (x) ∧ P (px)). (12)
The constructive version of the law of excluded middle given by its functional
interpretation is the statement that for any n, p there exists an element x
refuting (12):
P (x) ∨ ¬P (px).
The selection function ε witnesses this statement.
One can alternatively view the selection function ε interpreting A as an algo-
rithm that produces an arbitrary large approximation to the ineffective object
x satisfying ∀yA0(x, y). In fact, when Y = N the formula A is equivalent to
∃xX∀y∀i ≤ yA0(x, i). Hence, the functional interpretation of A is equivalent to
the existence of a selection functions ε satisfying
∀p ∀i ≤ p(εp)A0(εp, i).
We see p as a function that specifies in advance how we want to use A in a
particular computation, and ε returns a sufficiently high quality approximation
to x. This reading is closer to the notion of a ‘finitization’ of as discussed by Tao
in [23], in the sense that we interpret the qualitative statement that there exists
some x with the permanent property ∀yA0(x, y) by the quantitative statement
that there exist approximations x with the temporary property ∀i ≤ pxA0(x, i)
for arbitrary p.
Example 13 (Convergence and metastability). The functional interpretation of
Cauchy convergence
∀k > 0∃n∀i, j ≥ n (‖xi − xj‖ ≤ 2
−k)
is a sequence of selection functions (εk) that satisfy
∀k > 0, p ∀i, j ∈ [εkp, εkp+ p(εkp)] (‖xi − xj‖ ≤ 2
−k). (13)
In other words, the Cauchy convergence property is equivalent to the existence
of a sequence of selection functions εk that compute regions of approximate
stability, or metastability, of size specified by p.
This reformulation of convergence plays a key role in ergodic theory, where
one obtains quantitative versions of convergence theorems by extracting explicit
bounds on εkp that are highly uniform with respect to (xn). A simple example
is the so-called ‘finite convergence principle’ discussed in [14, 23], where one can
easily show that given k and p a bounded monotone sequence
0 ≤ x0 ≤ x1 ≤ . . . ≤ 1
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experiences a period of metastability bounded uniformly by p˜(2k + 1)(0) for
p˜(n) : +p(n).
A more involved example of the extraction of uniform bounds on the selection
functions is, for instance, the quantitative mean ergodic theorem proved by
Avigad et al. in [2].
3.2 Interpreting the axiom of choice
Classical predicate logic PLω can be extended to encompass most of mathematics
through the addition of choice principles. In particular the principle of finite
choice FC is known to be equivalent to induction and therefore we can define
Peano arithmetic (assuming a minimal amount of arithmetic) as PAω := PLω +
FC, while the further addition of countable choice AC0 yields a theory sufficient
to formalise a large portion of analysis.
Thus a key part of understanding the computational content of classical
proofs is to understand the computational interpretation of the axiom of count-
able choice combined with classical logic.
Let us first consider an instance of AC0 for Π1 formulas:
Π1-AC0 : ∀n∃x
X∀yYAn(x, y)→ ∃f
N→X∀n, yAn(fn, y),
for decidable An. Its negative translation is equivalent to
∀n¬¬∃x∀yAn(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f∀n, yAn(fn, y),
and its dialectica interpretation is equivalent (using just Markov’s principle,
which is admitted by the dialectica interpretation) to the statement
∀ε, q, ω∃f(∀n, pAn(εnp, p(εnp))→ ∀i ≤ ωfAi(fi, qf)). (14)
This constructive interpretation of AC0 asks for a selection function F
ε : JY×NX
N
producing an approximation to the sequence f , given selection functions ε in-
terpreting its premise. Such a selection function can be given by
F ε(q, ω) := EPSω〈〉(ε)(q).
We now prove in detail that the product of selection functions directly realizes
the functional interpretation of the axiom of choice.
Theorem 14. The following hold:
(a) The functional interpretation of the schema of finite choice
FC : ∀n ≤ N∃xXAn(x)→ ∃s
X∗∀n ≤ NAn(sn)
is directly witnessed by the finite simple product of selection functions (i.e.
ω a constant function).
(b) The functional interpretation of the schema of countable choice
AC0 : ∀n∃x
XAn(x)→ ∃f
XN∀nAn(fn)
is directly witnessed by the (unbounded) simple product of selection func-
tions.
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(c) The functional interpretation of the schema of dependent choice
DC : ∀sX
∗
∃xXAs(x)→ ∃f
XN∀nA[f ](n)(fn)
is directly witnessed by the dependent product of selection functions.
Proof. We prove (c), the other parts are particular cases of this. Since As(x) is
equivalent to ∃x˜X˜∀y|As(x)
N
|x˜y it suffices to interpret DC for Σ2-formulas
Σ2-DC : ∀s
X∗∃xX , x˜X˜∀y|As(x)
N
|x˜y → ∃f
XN∀n∃x˜X˜∀y|A[f ](n)(fn)
N
|x˜y .
Moreover, by adding a dummy variable t of type X˜∗ and concatenating the
types X , X˜ this follows directly from an instance of Π1-DC i.e.
Π1-DC : ∀s
X∗ , tX˜
∗
∃x, x˜∀y|As(x)
N |x˜y → ∃f
XN , f˜ X˜
N
∀n, y|A[f ](n)(fn)
N |f˜ny .
Therefore it suffices to deal with Π1-DC, which in general has a negative trans-
lation equiavalent to
Π1-DC
N : ∀sX
∗
¬¬∃xX∀yAs(x, y)→ ¬¬∃f∀n, yA[f ](n)(fn, y).
The dialectica interpretation of Π1-DC
N is equivalent to
|DCN |F,p,sε,ω,q ≡ As(εsp, p(εsp))→ A[F ](ωF )(F (ωF ), qF ), (15)
omitting, for the sake of readability, the parameters ε, ω and q from the functions
F, p and s. In fact, these parameters (ε, ω, q) define a sequential game in the
sense of Definition 9. Therefore, let
F = EPSω〈 〉(ε)(q)
ps(x) = EPS
ω
s∗x(ε)(qs∗x).
By Theorem 8 we have that F and p := p[F ](ωF ) and s := [F ](ωF ) are such
that εsp = F (ωF ) and p(εsp) = qF , and hence, clearly witness |DC
N |F,p,sε,ω,q . An
analogous but simpler argument proves (1) and (2), proofs of which can also be
found in [8] and [5] respectively.
Theorem 14 proves that under the functional interpretation we have a map-
ping
Choice principles 7→ Product of selection functions.
At first glance it may seem strange that an operation that computes optimal
strategies in sequential games is related to the axiom of choice is this manner.
But if we take a closer look, the game theoretic behaviour of (14) becomes
clear. The selection functions εn which realise the premise of (14) can be seen
as a collection of strategies each witnessing the Σ2 theorems (An). The dialec-
tica interpretation calls for a procedure that takes these pointwise strategies
and produces a co-operative selection function F that witnesses ∀nAn. Such a
procedure is provided naturally by the product of selection functions.
In the following examples we illustrate how the interpretation of theorems
that make direct use of the axiom of choice can be given an intuitive game-
theoretic constructive interpretation by the product of selection functions.
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Example 15 (Arithmetic comprehension). We first give a realizer for the func-
tional interpretation of arithmetic comprehension for Σ01 formulas, which states
that for any Σ1 predicate ϕ over N there exists a set X with
∀n(n ∈ X ⇔ ∃y ϕ(n, y)).
Computing such X is in general not possible. We can, however, try to compute
an “approximation” toX . For instance, we might ask for an X˜ which only works
for a finite number of n’s, or an approximation which only checks the existence
of y’s up to a certain bound (possibly depending on the approximating set X˜).
We call these calibrations of the ‘size’ and ‘depth’ of X , respectively.
Arithmetic comprehension follows from the formal statement
∃fN→N∀n(∃y ϕ(n, y)→ ∃k < fn ϕ(n, k)),
where we define X := {n | ∃k < fn ϕ(n, k)}. Again, we cannot (in general)
effectively construct X . Indeed, the above is a direct consequence of countable
choice applied the non-constructive statement
∀n∃xN(∃y ϕ(n, y)→ ∃k < x ϕ(n, k)). (16)
But this is just a collection of instances of DP applied to the formulas Pn(x) :=
∃k < x ϕ(n, k). Therefore defining the sequence of selection functions (εn) by
εnp :=
{
0 if ∀k < p(0) ¬ϕ(n, k)
p(0) if ∃k < p(0) ϕ(n, k)
we have
∃k < p(εnp) ϕ(n, k)→ ∃k < εnp ϕ(n, k)
for any n, p, and thus by Theorem 8, for any counterexample functionals ω, q,
setting F := EPSω〈〉(ε)(q) we have
∀i ≤ ωF (∃k < qF ϕ(i, k)→ ∃k < Fi ϕ(i, k)) (17)
which is equivalent to the functional interpretation of Σ1-CA. So what is the
game-theoretic interpretation of our realizer F? If we unravel (17) we see that
we are essentially constructing a finite set
XF := {i ≤ ωF | ∃k < Fi ϕ(i, k)}
that serves as an approximation to X with the property that if i ≤ ωF has a
witness for ϕ bounded by qF then we must have i ∈ XF . In this sense ω and q
can be read as set functions that calibrate the ‘size’ and ‘depth’ respectively of
an approximation to X .
The set XF is constructed as an optimal play in the game (ε, q, ω). The job
of the selection functions at round n is to decide whether or not to include the
number n in the approximation, given that it has already made this decision for
{0, . . . , n−1}. Its default is to omit n by playing 0, but if the resulting outcome
pn(0) bounds some witness to n, it instead adds n and steals this witness as
justification.
Therefore in this scenario the product of selection functions forms an in-
tuitive set-theoretic construction, starting with the empty set and strategically
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adding elements until it reaches the desired approximation. When interpreting a
theorem that makes use of arithmetic comprehension as a lemma, we can simply
plug in our realizer and impart its game theoretic meaning to better understand
the realizer of the main theorem.
Some simple examples of well-known existence theorems that can be given
a direct constructive interpretation using this instance of the product can be
found in e.g. Simpson [21], such as the existence of maximal ideas in countable
commutative rings or torsion subgroups in countable abelian groups. A more
involved consequence of arithmetic comprehension using a more complex game,
the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, will be discussed in the next section.
Example 16 (No injection (N→ N)→ N). Following [18] we show that a higher
type instance of the product that produces a sequence of functions can be used
to effectively prove that there is no injection Ψ: (N→ N)→ N in any model of
functionals in which the unbounded product exists. This time we consider the
drinkers paradox applied to the formulas Pn(f
N→N) := (n = Ψf). Defining
εnp :=
{
p(0) if n = Ψ(p(0))
0N
N
if n 6= Ψ(p(0)),
where 0N
N
= λk.0, we have
∀n, p(n = Ψ(p(εnP ))→ n = Ψ(εnp)).
As before, by Theorem 8, setting F := EPSω〈〉(ε)(q) we obtain
∀n ≤ ωF (n = Ψ(qF )→ n = Ψ(Fn)). (18)
Setting qF
N→N
:= λk.(Fk(k) + 1) we have a diagonal function that differs from
each Fk at point k. Furthermore, if we set ωF = Ψ(qF ), then from (18) on
i = ωF = Ψ(qF ) we obtain
Ψ(qF ) = Ψ(FΨ(qF )).
But qF and FΨ(qF ) differ by definition, and we’re done.
This is simply a constructive version of the usual diagonalisation argument
used to prove that there is no injection from the real numbers to the natural
numbers. The outcome functional qα is defined so that it differs from each of the
αi on at least one value. As before, the εn plays a default value 0 and looks at
the diagonal function pn(0) obtained by applying q to the optimal continuation
of this move. If Ψ(pn(0)) it steals this witness and sets αn = pn(0), else it
is not concerned and sticks with the default move. The idea is to construct a
sequence of representative functions α such that if Ψh for some h, then we must
also have Ψ(αn). Of course we cannot effectively produce such an α, but using
the product of selection functions we can produce an approximation that works
at the point Ψ(qα), which is actually all that we need.
3.3 The product versus standard modes of recursion
A consequence of Theorem 14, and the fact that classical arithmetic and analysis
can be formulated as classical logic plus finite and countable choice respectively,
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is that the functional interpretation of classical proofs can be given entirely in
terms of the product of selection functions. In fact we can reformulate Theorem
2 as follows, although we omit the details here and encourage the reader to
consult [5, 8] instead.
Theorem 17. We have
(a) PAω has a functional interpretation in primitive recursive arithmetic plus
the finite product of selection functions (see [8] for details).
(b) PAω+AC0 has a functional interpretation in primitive recursive arithmetic
plus the unbounded product of selection functions.
It is natural then to ask how the product compares to those modes of recur-
sion typically used in the functional interpretation of arithmetic and analysis.
Go¨del’s primitive recursive functionals of finite type [11] are the functional
analogue of induction. By Theorem 14 (a) the finite product of selection func-
tions is a functional analogue of finite choice, which is known to be equivalent to
induction [20]. In [8] it is shown that the finite product is in fact equivalent to
Go¨del’s primitive recursors over a weak λ-calculus, and thus offers an alternative
construction of system T.
Countable choice and dependent choice are typically interpreted using Spec-
tor’s bar recursion [22]. By Theorem 14 (b) and (c) we see that these are also
interpreted by the unbounded product, and in [5] it is shown that bar recursion
is primitive recursively equivalent to the unbounded product. The whole picture
is sketched in Figure 1.
Induction
[11] //
KS
[20]

Primitive recursionKS
[8]

Finite choice
[8]
// Finite product
Unbounded product
KS
[6]

Countable/dependent choice
[22]
33❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣❣
[5]
++❳❳❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳❳
❳
Spector’s bar recursion
Figure 1: Functional intepretation of arithmetic and analysis
Of course our point here is that the advantage of using the product as op-
posed to the other modes of recursion is that it has a highly intuitive semantics,
and witnesses extracted using the product often have a clear game-theoretic
meaning. This is in stark constrast to other methods, particularly Spector’s bar
recursion, which are often very difficult to comprehend on a semantic level.
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4 Interpreting the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
In this section we present a case study in which we formally extract a realizer
for the functional interpretation of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem using the
product of selection functions.
The constructive content of this theorem has been studied before, and in
particular a detailed analysis using the dialectica interpretation and Spector’s
bar recursion is given in [15].
Our aim here is to show that, even though the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
is relatively complex from a logical point of view, one can extract from its proof
a program whose behaviour can be clearly understood, at least on an informal
level, in terms of optimal strategies in sequential games.
As in [15] we analyse a proof of the theorem that combines countable choice
with weak Ko¨nig’s lemma - the statement that all infinite binary trees T have
an infinite branch:
WKL : ∀n∃sB
n
T (s)→ ∃α∀n T ([α](n)).
We use the product of selection functions only to interpret the instance of count-
able choice used in the proof, as this forms the core of the extracted algorithm.
In [12] Howard showed that WKL has a functional interpretation using only a
weak, binary form of bar recursion. Rather than interpreting WKL using the
product of selection functions (as done in [19]), for simplicity we just make use
of Howard’s realizer as its contribution to the complexity of the overall program
is small compared to the main instance of the product.
4.1 The Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem.
The Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem states that any bounded sequence in Rn has
a convergent subsequence. Here we restrict ourselves to sequences of rationals
(xi) in the unit interval [0, 1], as our analysis can be readily generalised. In the
language of formal analysis, the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is given by
BW(xi) : ∃a
B
N
, bN
N
∀n(bn < b(n+ 1) ∧ xbn ∈ I[a](n)),
where for a finite sequence of booleans s we define the interval
Is :=
|s|−1∑
i=0
si
2i+1
,
|s|−1∑
i=0
si
2i+1
+
1
2|s|

for |s| > 0 and I〈〉 := [0, 1]. Intuitively a encodes a limit point a¯ :=
∑∞ ai
2i+1
of the sequence (xi) and b defines a subsequence converging to this limit point,
where |xbn − a¯| ≤ 2
−(n−1) for all n.
The functional interpretation of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is given
by
|BW(xi)|
A,B
ψ = ∀n ≤ ψAB(Bn < B(n+ 1) ∧ xBn ∈ I[A](n)),
where, to easy readability, we are omitting the dependency of A and B on ψ. The
interpreted theorem states that there exist arbitrary large finite approximations
B to a convergent subsequence, in the sense that |xBn − A¯| ≤ 2
−(n−1) for all
n ≤ ψAB.
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4.2 A formal proof of BW(xi).
Assume an infinite sequence of rationals (xi)i∈N is fixed. Let us prove theorem
BW(xi), i.e.
∃aB
N
, bN
N
∀n(bn < b(n+ 1) ∧ xbn ∈ I[a](n))
directly using WKL and AC0. We define the predicate T by
T (sB
∗
, k) := |s| < k ∧ ∃i ∈ (|s|, k]
(
xi ∈ Is
)
. (19)
We write B∗ for finite sequences of booleans, and Bn for sequences of booleans
of length n.
Lemma 18. By countable choice AC0 there exists a function β : N → N such
that
∀n, sB
n
(∃kT (s, k)→ T (s, βn)). (20)
Proof. By the drinkers paradox we have
∀n, sB
n
∃l(∃kT (s, k)→ T (s, l)).
By bounded collection and the fact that T has the monotonicity property
T (s, k)→ T (s, k + l) we have
∀n∃L∀sB
n
(∃kT (s, k)→ T (s, L)). (21)
Finally, by countable choice we obtain β satisfying (20).
For the rest of the section let β be a function whose existence is shown in
the above lemma, so β satifies (20). Also, define T β(s) := T (s, β(|s|)), so that
∃kT (s, k)↔ T β(s).
Corollary 19. T β(s) is a decidable tree predicate.
Proof. T β(s) is clearly decidable in the given oracle β. It remains to see that
it is prefix-closed. Observe that T (s ∗ t, β(|s ∗ t|)) → T (s, β(|s ∗ t|)), by the
definition of T . Also, by (20), T (s, β(|s∗ t|))→ T (s, β(|s|)). Combining the two
we have T β(s ∗ t)→ T β(s).
Hence, given a decidable binary tree predicate, we can apply weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma to obtain the following:
Lemma 20. There exists a sequence a : BN such that
∀n
(
n < βn ∧ ∃i ∈ (n, βn]
(
xi ∈ I[a](n)
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tβ([a](n))
. (22)
Proof. This follows from WKL applied to T β, once we have shown that the tree
T β(s) has branches of arbitrary length. To see that, fix n and let s, with |s| = n,
be the index of the interval Is which contains xn. Then, clearly we have
|s| < n+ 1 ∧ xn ∈ Is
which implies T (s, n+ 1). By (20) we obtain T (s, β(|s|)). For future reference,
we call h this function producing s for each given n.
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Theorem 21 (Bolzano-Weierstrass). Given a sequence of rationals (xi)i∈N,
there exists a : BN and b : NN such that
∀n(bn < b(n+ 1) ∧ xbn ∈ I[a](n)). (23)
Proof. Let a be as in Lemma 20. Define b by
b0 := 0 (24)
b(n+ 1) := µi ∈ (bn+ 1, β(bn+ 1)]
(
xi ∈ I[a](bn+1)
)
.
By (22) such least i ∈ (bn+1, β(bn+1)] satisfying xi ∈ I[a](bn+1) always exists.
Clearly we have bn < b(n + 1), and also xb(n+1) ∈ I[a](bn+1) ⊆ I[a](n+1), since
bn+ 1 ≥ n+ 1.
4.3 Lemma 18 via the product of selection functions
We first interpret our main instance of countable choice (Lemma 18). We want
to produce an approximation to the function β given counterexample functions
ω, q : NN → N for n and k respectively in (20):
∀ω, q∃β∀n ≤ ωβ∀sB
n
(T (s, qβ)→ T (s, βn)). (25)
First we need to find selection functions δn : N
N → N witnessing the functional
interpretation of (21):
∃δ∀n, p∀sB
n
(T (s, p(δnp))→ T (s, δnp)). (26)
Since (21) is just the drinkers paradox combined with bounded collection, ap-
propriate selection functions are constructed in a similar manner to (10).
Lemma 22. Let δn be defined as
δnp := p
i(0) (27)
where i is the least ≤ 2n such that, for all sB
n
, T (s, pi+1(0)) → T (s, pi(0)).
Then δ witnesses (26).
Proof. Note that (26) holds by definition once we show that such i ≤ 2n must
exist. Assume, for the sake of a contradiction, that
(I) for all i ≤ 2n there exists an sB
n
such that T (s, pi+1(0)) and ¬T (s, pi(0)).
Because T (s, k) is monotone on the second argument, (I) implies that
(II) pi(0) < p(pi(0)), for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Since, in (I), we have 2n + 1 possible values for i but only 2n possible values
for s, there must be an s and distinct i and j, say i < i + 1 ≤ j, such that
T (s, pi+1(0)) and ¬T (s, pj(0)). By (II), however, that is a contradiction.
Theorem 23. Given q : NN → N and ω : NN → N let β : NN be defined as
β := EPSω〈〉(δ)(q),
with δ as in (27). Then β witnesses (25).
Proof. By Lemma 22, the δn as defined in (27) are such that
∀n, p∀sB
n
(T (s, p(δnp))→ T (s, δnp)).
For n ≤ ωβ and p = p[β](n), by Theorem 8 we have βn = δnp and qβ = p(δnp),
from which we can conclude ∀sB
n
(T (s, qβ)→ T (s, βn)).
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4.4 A realizer for BW(xi)
Finally, we show how the instance of the product of selection functions in The-
orem 23, used to interpret the crucial Lemma 18, lies behind an algorithm for
constructing approximations to BW. We first interpret Lemma 20, making use
of Howard’s realizer for WKL using a weak, binary form of bar recursion, full
details of which can be found in [12].
Lemma 24. For any counterexample function ϕ : BN × NN → N there exist
β : NN and A : BN satisfying
∀n ≤ ϕAβ
(
n < βn ∧ ∃i ∈ (n, βn]
(
xi ∈ I[A](n)
))︸ ︷︷ ︸
T ([A](n),βn)
. (28)
Proof. Assume ϕ : BN × NN → N given. For any given β : NN let Nβ : B∗ → N
be defined via Howard’s binary bar recursion as
Nβ(t) :=
{
0 if ∃s  t (ϕ(sˆ, β) < |s|)
1 + max{Nβ(t ∗ 0), Nβ(t ∗ 1)} otherwise.
We first construct β as in Theorem 23 where we set
qβ = ωβ := Nβ(〈〉) + 1,
to obtain
∀n ≤ Nβ(〈〉) ∀sB
n
(T (s,Nβ(〈〉) + 1)→ T (s, βn)). (29)
Let N = Nβ for β as just defined. It can be shown (cf. Howard [13]) that for
any |t| ≥ N(〈〉) there is some s  t with ϕ(sˆ, β) < |s|. Therefore we define
A := tˆ, where t = µs  h(N(〈〉)) (ϕ(sˆ, β) < |s|)
where h is defined as in the proof of Lemma 20. Now, by the definition of h we
have T (h(N(〈〉)), N(〈〉) + 1). Also, for n ≤ ϕ(A, β), by the definition of t (in
definition of A) we have n < |t|, and hence [A](n)  h(N(〈〉)). Therefore, by
the definition of T (s, k) we also have T ([A](n), N(〈〉) + 1). Finally, by (29) we
get T ([A](n), βn), and so we have proved (28).
We are in a position now to effectively witness an approximation to the real
Bolzano-Weierstrass (Theorem 21).
Theorem 25. For any counterexample function ψ : BN × NN → N there exists
A : BN and B : NN satisfying
∀n ≤ ψAB(Bn < B(n+ 1) ∧ xBn ∈ I[A](n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
|BW(xi)|
A,B
ψ
.
Proof. Let ba,β denote the construction in (24), and let
β˜(n) := max
i≤n+1
β(i).
Define
ϕ(A, β) := β˜ψ(A,bA,β)(0).
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Construct A and β as in Lemma 24 using counterexample function ϕ as above
defined, and let B := bA,β. By (28) we have
∀n ≤ β˜ψAB(0)
(
n < βn ∧ ∃i ∈ (n, βn]
(
xi ∈ I[A](n)
))
. (30)
This is an approximation of Lemma 20, but it is enough to obtain our desired
approximation of Theorem 21. Indeed, for all n ≤ ψAB we are guaranteed to
have, by (30), that Bn < B(n+ 1) and xBn ∈ I[A](n).
4.5 Understanding the realizer for BW(xi)
Let us first take an informal look at the game that forms the basis of the
interpretation of countable choice given in Section 4.3. The strategy at round
n is to pick a number m satisfying
∃j ∈ (n, p(m)] (xj ∈ Is)→ ∃j ∈ (n,m] (xj ∈ Is)
for all s : Bn. In other words, given a local outcome function p : N → N, the
selection function picks a number m = δnp such that whenever the interval Is
contains some xj where j in bounded by the outcome p(m) of playing m, then
Is also contains some xj with j bounded by m.
The selection function δn prescribes what is essentially an iterated version
of the strategy given for the drinkers paradox (10). It first attempts to play
m = 0 provided that ∀sB
n
∀j ∈ (n, p(0)] (xj /∈ Is). But this cannot be the case
unless p(0) ≤ n. Hence, if p(0) > n, there exists an s and a j ∈ (n, p(0)]
with xj ∈ Is. It then continues and attempts to play p(0) in the hope that no
additional intervals Is contain xj for j ∈ (p(0), p
2(0)]. Continuing along these
lines, it is not difficult to see that m = pkn(0) must work for some k ≤ 2
n since
there are only 2n intervals Is, with |s|.
The resulting optimal strategy in the game (δ, ω, q) is a sequence β that acts
as an approximation to the function ineffectively constructed in Lemma 18:
∀n ≤ ωβ ∀sB
n
(∃k ∈ (n, qβ] (xj ∈ Is)→ ∃j ∈ (n, βn] (xj ∈ Is)).
The power of this procedure is evident when we observe that by constructing
the outcome function q and control function ω as in Section 4.4 (incorporating
Howard’s realizer for WKL), the resulting optimal play β can be directly used
to construct approximations A and B for BW(xi).
Our aim here has been to convince the reader that while constructing a
realizer for the functional interpretation of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem
takes a reasonable amount of work, the game theoretic intuition behind the
product of selection functions allows us to gain a better understanding of the
key operational features of this realizer.
5 Further remarks
In this article we have shown that the language of selection functions and se-
quential games underlies the dialectica interpretation of classical proofs in a
fundamental way, and we have used the product of selection functions to con-
struct a concise and intuitive computational interpretation of some well-known
theorems.
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Our motivation has been a more qualitative understanding of functional
interpretations, as a response the fact that formal proof-theoretic methods are
becoming increasingly relevant in modern mathematics. We have shown that
the product of selection functions is a fundamental construction behind the
dialectica interpretation of classical proofs, and we hope to have convinced the
reader that in practise it leads to extracted programs that have an expressive
reading in terms of optimal strategies in sequential games.
There is a lot of work to be done towards understanding formal proof-
theoretic techniques in mathematical terms, and the question of adapting and
refining functional interpretations so that they can be seen as intelligent trans-
lations on mathematical proofs as opposed to just syntactic translations on logic
sentences forms a very interesting area of research. The authors believe that
there are several potentially fruitful avenues for further research.
One is to explore in more detail the link between the dialectica interpretation
and the closely related ‘correspondence principle’ implicitly used in areas like
ergodic theory. In particular, the finitary version of theorems discussed by Tao
in [23, 24] are strictly speaking related to the monotone variant of the dialectica
interpretation, which extracts uniform bounds, or majorants, for realizers of
the interpretation. It would be interesting to try to gain an understanding of
how the product of selection functions can be used to extract realizers for the
monotone interpretation and therefore produce constructive proofs of theorems
that can truly be seen as ‘finitizations’ in the sense of Tao.
Another interesting issue is the efficiency of the product of selection func-
tions in producing a realizer. For instance, a quick analysis of Example 16 shows
that if Ψ(λn.0) = Ψ(λn.1), our program potentially misses this obvious coun-
terexample and eventually produces a much more elaborate one. This highlights
the fact that while the product is indeed an intuitive realizer for the axiom of
choice, it is far from optimal and refinements of the procedure or even com-
pletely different recursion schemata may be more suited to interpreting specific
principles. An example of this is open recursion proposed by Berger in [4] for
the realizability interpretation of the minimal bad sequence argument.
A related question is the efficiency of the dialectica interpretation itself, and
the comparison of extracted programs to those obtained using other proof inter-
pretations such as modified realizability. In particular, the modified realizability
interpretation of choice has an interesting realizer given by Berardi et al. [3]
that was also shown to have a natural game theoretic reading.
We conclude with the remark that our paper belongs to a larger body of
recent work on the theory of selection functions and sequential games by the
first author and M. Escardo´, starting with [6] and surveyed in [7]. Particularly
relevant is [19], in which the product of selection functions is used to extract a
game theoretic realizer for Ramsey’s theorem. This can be seen as an extended
case study illustrating the methods employed here.
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